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PCAOB to Start Inspecting Firms Who Audit Broker-Dealers…Sort Of

Posted on by Caleb Newquist

Prior to Dodd-Frank, auditors who inspected the books of nonpublic brokers and dealers were required to register with the PCAOB but managed to avoid being subjected to the Board Insepctors’ Monday Morning QBing. Now that we’ve entered a new, exciting era of mind-numbingly complex financial regulation, auditors of all broker-dealers will soon know the pleasure of the PCAOB inspection process.

But before any of you get your knickers in a twist, it’s technically an “Interim Program,” because, in all honesty, the Board isn’t exactly sure who should be getting extra-special attention and who they can ignore.


This is part of the statement from Perpetual-acting Chair Dan Goel://pcaobus.org/News/Releases/Pages/12092010_OpenBoardMeeting.aspx”>today’s open meeting (full statement on following slide):

About 520 brokerage firms provide clearing or custodial services. Many of the others are introducing firms that, at least in theory, do not have access to client funds or securities. Some are floor brokers without public clients; some are insurance agents that sell products that are technically securities; some are finders active in the M&A market; some are captives that serve the trading needs of a single, affiliated client. Other categories undoubtedly exist. This diversity raises questions about whether we should devote resources to inspecting the auditors of all of these types of brokers and dealers or whether some of their auditors can safely be exempted from PCAOB oversight without compromising investor protection.

While the Board does not yet have the answers to those questions, the temporary rule will allow the Board to begin inspections of broker-dealer audits so that we can develop an empirical basis on which to eventually address them.

So, in other words, the Board has NFI where to start since the broker-dealer biz encapsulates a lot of different services. The unfortunate thing for auditors is that the inspectors have to start somewhere and that’s what this interim program will do. Mr Goelzer gives you a taste of the fun to come:

The interim inspections will focus both on reviewing the work performed on specific audits and on gathering facts to inform the Board’s consideration of a permanent program. The information-gathering aspect of the interim inspections will provide the Board with insight about the potential benefits of broker-dealer inspections to the investing public and about the potential costs and regulatory burdens that would be imposed on different categories of accounting firms and classes of brokers. Armed with this type of information, the Board will be in a better position to decide on possible exemptions from oversight and to determine the objectives, nature, and frequency of inspections for firms that remain subject to PCAOB jurisdiction.

So if you’re lucky, you might – just might! – get out of the whole process altogether, although, we suggest you don’t get your hopes up. When will this all get sorted out, you ask?

Decisions about the permanent inspection program are probably at least a year away. In the mean-time, there will be ample opportunity for the public to learn what the Board is finding in the interim program and to participate in the decision process.
The proposed temporary rule provides for transparency, in that the Board will issue public reports at least annually on the progress of the interim program and on any significant observations. The permanent broker-dealer auditor inspection program will be predicated on rules that will only be adopted by the Board after public notice-and-comment and will only take effect after Securities and Exchange Commission approval.

So if this whole thing sounds like a dry run, it is. However if inspectors stumble across some über-shoddy audits (bound to happen), the Board is reserving the right to lay the smackdown. From Board Member Steven Harris’s statement (full text on last slide), “While the temporary inspection rules anticipate that firm-specific inspection reports would not begin until after a permanent program takes effect, it is important to note that the Board will still take disciplinary action, as appropriate, against an auditor where inspections under the interim program have identified significant issues in the firm’s audit work.” Likewise, if the inspectors happen across out of the ordinary at the B-D (again, a distinct possibility), they will be ringing up the SEC.

So while on the one hand they’re testing the waters, if you happen to be a downright horrible auditing firm, they’re going to make an example out of you. Investor protection is still at stake, you know.

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KPMG, Center for Audit Quality Weren’t Too Keen on PCAOB Inspection Documents Being Subpoenaed

Last week, we told you about Jonathan Weil’s latest scoop exposing a PCAOB issuer in an inspection report. The issuer in question was Motorola and it, once again, featured KPMG as the auditor on the receiving end of the Board’s criticism. It was also noted that PCAOB Chair Jim Doty mentioned this particular case (without naming names) in his speech at USC the previous week when he described “one large firm tam was aware that a significant contract was not signed until the early hours of the fourth quarter. Nevertheless, the audit partner allowed the company to book the transaction in the third quarter, which allowed the company to meet its earnings target.”

J Dubs put this all together in a nice little package, citing court documents from a class-action lawsuit in Chicago. What isn’t mentioned in Weil’s column but is spelled out in other court documents that we’ve reviewed is that KPMG and the Center of Audit Quality fought the release of the documents related to the PCAOB’s inspection report because they’re afraid that more lawsuits could result if issuers’ identities are made public.

The CAQ submitted an amicus curiae brief (in full on the next page) stating:

The supervisory model of regulation created by Sarbanes-Oxley and implemented by the PCAOB has thus far worked well and has improved the quality and reliability of audits of public companies. It has worked to the satisfaction of both the Board and the regulated community.

Since the PCAOB’s own Investor Advisory Group issued a report entitled “The Watchdog that Didn’t Bark … Again,” one might say that the Center’s final point is debatable.

Yet, the CAQ argued that if the PCAOB inspection documents were released, “the [Sarbanes-Oxley] Act’s carefully supervisory model will be adversely affected.” That is, the confidentiality afforded to the communication between auditors and the PCAOB would be compromised and would allow Board information into the ‘hands of litigating lawyers.’ The CAQ declined to comment for this post, saying that they did not “have anything to add to the amicus brief.”

In her ruling denying KPMG’s motion (in full, on page 3) to squash the subpoena of the PCAOB documents, Judge Amy St. Eve cited KPMG’s argument that sounds very similar to the CAQ’s:

KPMG argues that “if litigants can compel production of materials related to the PCAOB’s confidential inspection process notwithstanding section 105(b)(5)(A), open and constructive engagement between the PCAOB and accounting firms could be chilled by the threat of increased civil litigation, and the statutory framework carefully crafted by Congress to improve the quality of public company audits could be frustrated.”

So basically auditors are afraid that if their super-special-secret discussions with the PCAOB are out there for all the world to see, they’ll get sued more often. But hasn’t suing audit firms already reached critical mass? Can they really fear more litigation? The only thing that keeps audit firms from being on the same level of litigation risk as tobacco companies is that they aren’t killing people.

Weil and those that agree with him argue that the PCAOB owes it to investors to name names in their inspection reports. To continue keeping issuers confidential protects them from legitimate criticism for shoddy accounting and perpetuating equally shoddy audits. Of course, if you’re an investor and that doesn’t bother you, then maybe you’re okay with auditors trying to stop the release of more information related to their work. Work that cost the investors in Motorola $244 million from 2000 to 2010.

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