The Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner’s Report is an aggravating example of, “Be careful what you wish for.” The mainstream media (MSM) is now paying attention to the Big 4 – Deloitte, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Ernst & Young.

The financial crisis is now about accounting fraud.

Every two-bit journalist and blogger on the business beat is spitting out stories to keep up and one-up each other. It’s not every day that the accounting firms provide so much gossip about spectacular criminal and civil penalties. Well, actually, it is every day. There’s almost a thousand stories at re: The Auditors pointing to just such an outcome if any of the Big 4 ever looked down the barrel of a litigation shotgun like Lehman.


Ryan Chittum is a Staff Writer for The Audit, part of the Columbia Journalism Review where he critiques media coverage of business. Yes. It really is called The Audit.

On March 15th Ryan claimed blogs are beating MSM on the Lehman story but lamented the short attention spans of most publications.

Look, I know that Lehman collapsed a year and a half ago, but this is a major story—one that finally gets awfully close to putting the crimes in the crisis. I’ll go ahead and say it: If you’ve wanted to know about the Valukas report and its implications, you’ve been better served by reading Zero Hedge and Naked Capitalism than you have The Wall Street Journal or New York Times…

Welcome to my world, Ryan.

On March 16th, Ryan over-the-knee spanked John Carney, Managing Editor of Clusterstock, for tripping all over himself arguing against prosecutions for Lehman scandal actors.

I suppose we shouldn’t be surprised that John Carney thinks “We Should Not Criminally Prosecute Lehman Executives.” After all, this is someone who is a fan of insider trading, which he says “harms no one” and ought to be legalized….

I agree with Ryan. John Carney has it all wrong. Does being on TV a lot create the delusion that wishing can make it so? John Carney practiced law. He knows better.

Anton Valukas, the Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner and Chairman of law firm Jenner & Block, knows his way around white-collar and corporate defense. If Valukas points to “colorable claims,” I’m apt to believe there’s some colorful legal culpability to see. Jenner & Block had so many lawyers working long hours on the report, Valukas probably had Gene & Georgetti’s on speed dial.

But the Examiner’s Report is still developing. Valukas points to many areas where he had neither the time nor the stomach to explore further. He not so subtly tells other interested parties to go wild.

Is Ernst & Young going to fail like Arthur Andersen?

These are easy tropes to toss – Andersen, Enron and off-balance sheet shenanigans. But the Repo 105 discussion is a distraction. So is the “Sarbanes-Oxley failed us” whine. Repo 105 is not off-balance sheet accounting but good old-fashioned “round-trip” transaction shenanigans. This was garden variety accounting manipulation by the highest levels of the corporation, accomplished with the acquiescence of the impotent auditors. I described these techniques three weeks ago, “…Can Anyone Catch Lehman Stealing?” But finance bloggers often shine these turds to make them worthy of their dazzling quanty brains.

The biggest criminal exposure for the Lehman executives comes from their alleged lies about the use of the Repo 105 transaction as a “sale” or revenue recognition transaction versus a financing technique. This was not disclosed. They skipped it in the filings and confirmed these lies when signing false quarterly Section 302 certifications. These are criminal violations of law. We may also learn these sleights of hand with scienter were designed to provide cover for insider trading or options backdating activities. Those actions would also be criminal. And then there’s the possibility Fuld and others lied to Congress or other investigators. That could handcuff their attempt to avoid criminal prosecution.

Lehman executives are already defending against significant civil suits. I think more suits will be filed naming directors, especially audit committee members, in spite of the pass they got from Valukas. There are already tons naming executives, directors, Ernst and Young and others as defendants.

Ernst & Young is now vulnerable to more suits, better-drafted suits, bigger than $1 billion dollar suits. Civil suits won’t kill EY right away. EY may die, however, from suffocation if their legal contingency numbers rise rapidly enough. Or they may suffer a slow death from a thousand cuts when the cost to defend the firm becomes overwhelming. But the public won’t know because the Big 4 audit firms do not issue audited financial statements and do not disclose their legal contingencies or their reserves for those contingencies. We’ll have to depend on the regulators to keep an eye and make a plan if the cookie starts to crumble.

Arthur Andersen died because a criminal indictment prohibited them from signing audit opinions. That’s the business they were in and they were forced to turn in the keys. But Andersen was already on life support because of the number of lawsuits they were facing prior to Enron, the overwhelming costs of defending themselves and the inevitable settlements. The end was already near.

EY is not likely to be criminally indicted as a firm. There may well be something they should be indicted for but the U.S. Department of Justice has no appetite for throwing kerosene on this smoldering pile of dung. Another possibility is that EY may be subject to criminal indictments outside of the U.S. The loss of the EY U.K. member firm would be as crippling to the network as loss of the U.S. firm. The U.K. regulatory authorities are questioning EY due to the cross-border Repo 105 transactions and their use of U.K. law firm Linklaters as a “fixer.”

I would bet real money EY will have to testify before the House Oversight and Financial Reform Committee soon. Legislators may finally get heads out of the ratings agencies’ ass and realize that the accounting firms are supposed to serve the public interest. The Big 4 abandoned this public duty a long time ago, Sarbanes-Oxley or no Sarbanes-Oxley. Add lying to Congress to their list of sins if they screw this up.

Finally, the EY audit partners will be delivered to gallows by their firm. Regulators and the Department of Justice have signaled they will nail individuals for civil sanctions and penalties as well as criminal violations. It happened at KPMG. They tossed partners overboard to avoid a prosecution from their tax shelter scandal. EY recently disowned partners who went to jail for similar crimes. But we may see EY sheltering Lehman audit partners Schlich and Hansen until the firm cuts their own deal.


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More on this Francine! More. More More. Keep up the good work. ;)

For the period on the second “More” above. Too excited about these FANTASTIC posts coming out of GC today.

Thanks so much! . ! . !

As someone recently offered a job by EY following an internship, I appreciate any and all insight/analysis on this subject. The more I know about the situation the better off I am with my decision. It may be back to the recruiting trail for me!

Don't let your EY recruiter know that! Keep your contact consistent and positive with them. Certainly stay in touch with the other recruiters as well…

I have been blogging about this Repo 105 transaction all week, having been in Lehman for a few months in 2007 on a project. I applaud you for pointing out the aspect that this scandal involves accounting fraud that is as old as the hills — not booking the whole transaction!

First off. Nothing's going to happen to EY. Secondly, if something does, like Arthur Andersen, the partners and what not will splinter off with their clients to the remaining big firms. If you're already here and/or will be soon, it'll take a while for EY to go down if it does it all. I would say BFD. If you didn't already know that EY would have exposure to Lehman like any other major bankruptcy, you'd be flipping crazy.

There is a significant difference between speculating “exposure” and being implicated by an examiners report that used phrases such as “professional malpractice”, “negligence” and “failure to exercise professional judgment” when discussing the manner in which EY conducted its audit (or, perhaps more accurately, failed to do so).

E&Y's involvement in this matter isn't “like any other major bankruptcy”, there is a very clear distinction to be made when a firm is, at best, complacent or, at worst, collaborative in the misrepresentation of the financial position of a company leading up to their “major bankruptcy”.

Thanks, I definitely will. No need to be burning bridges. But it's certainly an interesting situation to be in.

I have been trying to find specific Repo 105 transaction regulations all week, what is it specifically? it doesn't seem to be an accounting standard – as I could not find anything specific in FASB.

I understand what it is, I am just wondering how EY justified 105 theoretically.

Thanks, great article!

“Repo 105″ was the nickname given to a repurchase transaction where Lehman put up $105 in collateral for every $100 that they borrowed. What makes the transaction strange was that this was apparently almost always highly-rated collateral, things like U.S. bonds or other sovereign government bonds. Lehman continued to own the bond and was entitled to its coupon (interest).

Normally, when such a transaction is done, the borrower wants as much lending power as he/she can negotiate on his/her phone at the repo desk. Ideally, you get 100% loan for something valued at 100% of whatever you are putting up as collateral. You don't deliberately go and look for a deal where you are forced to put up more collateral than what the market (the other potential counterparties) demand.

This is about the same as if the homeowner who wanted a mortgage looked for a bank that would deliberately offer LESS of a mortgage (same interest rate, etc.) than others would—purposely look for a bad deal in order to make it. Why would you do that?

Or this one: “here, I want to borrow $10.”

“Ten dollars? Well I'll require that you give me something to hold on to in the meantime. Hey, maybe that thing worth $20.”

“Collateral worth just $20? Hey, why let me off so easy? Here, why not hold this thing worth $500 instead?” (Where both things are actually worth $20 and $500, no tricks. The collateral Lehman was using were good bonds where all the persons involved could determine the price.)

The Linklaters letter suggested that such a strange repo transaction would constitute a “sale” under English law, not a borrowing-on-collateral (where damn near everywhere else in the world anyone would say “hey, that looks like you're borrowing where your lender is demanding a lot of collateral!” Probably true in England, too)

So you won't find a regulation or even a section of SFAS 140 (however that is codified now) discussing the technique. Because it's a trade meant to perpetrate a fraud. Francine McKenna has been diligently pointing out all week that the root of this transaction is a “round trip” fraud—not recording all the pieces of the transaction. Lehman “relied” on Linklaters' interpretation of SFAS 140, but it isn't in there.

Hopefully the MSM will begin explaining it that was a well.

This is a great one Francine.

Pretty sure that there are more companies practicing this though.

As for EY, shits like this do happen kind of often, relationship between client and auditors. It ain't nice to maintain a tough relationship with a big client when you're human.

That being said, Big4's should serve in the interest of the public!

For those who do not know Repo 105: it is an accounting manoeuvre where a short-term loan is classified as a sale. The cash obtained through this “sale” is then used to pay down debt, allowing the company to appear to reduce its leverage by temporarily paying down liabilities—just long enough to reflect on the company's published balance sheet. After the company's financial reports are published, the company borrows cash and repurchases back its original assets.

For those who do not know Repo 105: it is an accounting manoeuvre where a short-term loan is classified as a sale. The cash obtained through this “sale” is then used to pay down debt, allowing the company to appear to reduce its leverage by temporarily paying down liabilities—just long enough to reflect on the company's published balance sheet. After the company's financial reports are published, the company borrows cash and repurchases back its original assets.

For those who do not know Repo 105: it is an accounting manoeuvre where a short-term loan is classified as a sale. The cash obtained through this “sale” is then used to pay down debt, allowing the company to appear to reduce its leverage by temporarily paying down liabilities—just long enough to reflect on the company's published balance sheet. After the company's financial reports are published, the company borrows cash and repurchases back its original assets.

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